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 “Virtual” Contacts 
and Patent Cases: 
How Should Internet-
Related Activity 
in Patent Cases 
Affect the Personal 
Jurisdiction 
Analysis? 
 By Megan M. La Belle 
 I
n the 1990s, when the Internet was still consid-
ered novel, courts struggled with the question of 
how Internet-related contacts should be treated in 
the personal jurisdiction analysis. So when  Zippo 
Manufacturing v. Zippo DOT Com 1 established an 
apparently easy-to-apply test for deciding whether 
a defendant’s virtual contacts are sufficient for per-
sonal jurisdiction, many courts embraced it . 2 To date, 
however, the Federal Circuit has neither adopted nor 
rejected the  Zippo approach, leaving litigants and lower 
courts in patent cases with little guidance on the issue. 
Although a recent decision suggests that the Federal 
Circuit recognizes the limitations of  Zippo , 3 it is time 
for the court to set forth clear guidelines for analyzing 
questions of personal jurisdiction in patent cases when 
the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are lim-
ited to Internet activity. 
 PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
IN PATENT CASES 
 In patent cases, Federal Circuit law governs 
substantive patent law issues, while the law of the 
regional circuits generally applies to procedural ques-
tions. The Federal Circuit has fashioned an excep-
tion, however, when the procedural question is 
“intimately involved in the substance of enforcement 
of the patent right.” 4 Because the Federal Circuit has 
determined that questions of personal jurisdiction 
fall within these parameters, its law is controlling on 
personal jurisdiction. 5 
 Like in other contexts, the test for personal juris-
diction in patent cases involves a two-step inquiry: 
(1) Does the forum’s long-arm statute permit service 
of process? and (2) Would the exercise of jurisdiction 
be inconsistent with due process? 6 Because most state 
long-arm statutes are co-extensive with the limits 
of due process, the two inquiries frequently collapse 
into one: whether the assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion comports with due process. Due process allows 
defendants to be sued only where they have meaning-
ful “contacts, ties, or relations” with the forum state 
and thus could reasonably anticipate being haled into 
court there. 7 In other words, a court cannot force a 
party to defend a lawsuit in a state unless the defen-
dant has the requisite “minimum contacts” with that 
state. 
 Courts use various tests to determine whether, 
in a given case, there have been sufficient mini-
mum contacts to subject the defendant to juris-
diction in the forum state. The nature of conduct 
required to meet the “minimum contacts” thresh-
old depends on whether plaintiff asserts a general 
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or specific  jurisdiction theory. To be subject to a 
court’s general jurisdiction, the defendant must 
have “continuous and systematic” contacts with the 
forum state. 8 Assuming such contacts exist, courts 
may exercise jurisdiction over the defendant with 
respect to any type of lawsuit, even if the action 
is not related to the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum state. 
 Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, requires 
less pervasive contacts between defendant and the 
forum state. But under this doctrine, courts are 
permitted to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant 
only if the lawsuit arises out of or is related to the 
defendant’s contacts with the forum. 9 In this situ-
ation, the “‘relationship among the defendant, the 
forum, and the litigation,’ is the essential foundation 
of  in personam jurisdiction.” 10 
 In assessing whether this relationship among the 
defendant, the forum, and the litigation supports the 
exercise of specific jurisdiction in patent cases, courts 
consider three factors: 
 1. Whether the defendant purposefully directed its 
activities at residents of the forum; 
 2. Whether the claim arises out of or relates to the 
defendant’s activities within the forum; and 
 3. Whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is 
reasonable and fair. 11 
 The purposeful direction requirement ensures 
that parties will not have to defend against lawsuits in 
different states based solely on random, fortuitous, or 
attenuated contacts or based on the unilateral activ-
ity of a third party. 12 Yet even a single contact may be 
sufficient for specific jurisdiction if it is directly and 
substantially related to the plaintiff ’s claims. 13 
 Applying this three-part specific jurisdiction test 
in patent cases often means that alleged  infringers—
most of whom are corporations that engage in inter-
state and international commerce—are subject to 
jurisdiction in practically any federal court in the 
country because: (1) the alleged infringer purposefully 
directs its activities at residents of the forum state by 
selling or offering to sell the accused product there; 
(2) the claim—patent infringement—arises out of or 
relates to the defendant’s activities within the forum; 
and (3) the assertion of personal jurisdiction is rea-
sonable and fair. 14 Questions arise, however, when 
the alleged infringer’s products reach the forum state 
indirectly, either via the Internet or through more 
traditional streams of commerce. 
 THE STREAM OF COMMERCE 
AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
 Even outside of the Internet context, it is often 
the case that a defendant’s only relevant contacts 
with a forum state are that its products have been 
placed into the stream of commerce and ultimately 
sold there. Under those circumstances, the ques-
tion is whether the forum state may assert jurisdic-
tion over an entity that “delivers its products into 
the stream-of-commerce with the expectation that 
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum 
state.” 15 
 Unfortunately, the parameters of the stream-of-
commerce doctrine have not been well defined by 
the Supreme Court. In  Asahi Metal Industry v. Superior 
Court , a majority of the justices could not agree as 
to the requirements for personal jurisdiction under a 
stream-of-commerce theory. 16 One opinion, authored 
by Justice O’Connor, found that “[t]he placement of a 
product into the stream-of-commerce, without more, 
is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed 
toward the forum State,” and that the requisite 
something “more” might be marketing, advertising, 
service, or design done with the forum in mind. 17 
Justice Brennan opined, by contrast, that placing a 
product in the stream of commerce with an awareness 
“that the final product is being marketed in the forum 
State” is all that is necessary to subject a defendant to 
jurisdiction. 18 
 While some appellate courts have adopted either 
the O’Connor or Brennan approach to stream-of-
commerce jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit has not 
yet taken a position on the issue. 19 In patent infringe-
ment cases, therefore, district courts frequently are 
forced to look to the law of the regional circuit in 
which they sit. Consequently, the law in patent cases 
with respect to personal jurisdiction based on the 
stream-of-commerce theory is all over the map. In 
some states, a defendant will be subject to jurisdiction 
because its allegedly infringing product was placed 
into the stream of commerce and ultimately reached 
the forum state, while placing the product into the 
stream of commerce will not suffice for personal juris-
diction in other states. This makes it very difficult, if 
not impossible, for patent defendants to regulate their 
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behavior and predict where they might be subject 
to suit. 
 THE  ZIPPO DECISION 
 The  Zippo case arose in the context of a trade-
mark dispute, but it has had far-reaching implications. 
The question in  Zippo was whether the defendant, a 
California corporation whose principal business was 
an Internet news service that allowed Internet users 
to access newsgroups through its Web site, was subject 
to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff 
conceded that the defendant was not subject to gen-
eral jurisdiction, so the only question was whether its 
contacts were sufficient for specific jurisdiction. 20 
 In order for a defendant to be subject to specific 
jurisdiction, the cause of action must arise out of or 
be related to the defendant’s forum-related conduct. 
The court in  Zippo found that this requirement was 
satisfied since a significant amount of the alleged 
trademark infringement and dilution had occurred in 
Pennsylvania. 21 
 The more difficult question was whether the 
de fendant had purposefully availed itself of Penn-
sylvania by engaging in electronic commerce with 
residents of that forum. To answer this question, the 
court introduced a sliding-scale test that characterizes 
virtual contacts as falling into three categories. 22 At 
one end of the scale are “active” Web sites, which are 
used to conduct business transactions. If, for example, 
the buyer electronically transmits payment to the 
defendant that electronically transmits the purchased 
product to the buyer, the  Zippo court considered such 
conduct “purposeful” for the personal jurisdiction 
analysis. At the opposite end of the spectrum are 
“passive” Web sites where a defendant simply makes 
information available on a site that may be accessed 
by residents of other states. According to  Zippo , the 
maintenance of such a passive Web site does not 
satisfy the purposeful availment requirement. Finally, 
in the middle of the sliding scale are “interactive” 
Web sites, which allow for the exchange of informa-
tion between the Web site’s host and non-residents, 
but where business transactions do not necessarily 
occur. Interactive Web sites may or may not subject 
the defendant to personal jurisdiction; that depends 
on the level of interactivity and the commercial 
nature of the exchange of information that occurs on 
the site. 
 Applying this newly articulated test to the 
case before it, the  Zippo court concluded that the 
Web site at issue was “active” and that defendant 
was doing business over the Internet. In particu-
lar, approximately 140,000 people worldwide had 
subscribed to defendant’s service by completing an 
online application and then making an electronic 
payment. Defendant then assigned each subscriber 
a password that permitted the subscriber to view 
and download newsgroup messages stored on the 
defendant’s server in California. Of these 140,000 
customers, approximately 3,000 were Pennsylvania 
residents; moreover, defendant had entered into 
agreements with seven Internet service providers 
in Pennsylvania to allow these 3,000 customers to 
access the new service. 
 Finally, the  Zippo court rejected defendant’s argu-
ment that the exercise of jurisdiction would be 
unreasonable given Pennsylvania’s strong interest in 
adjudicating trademark disputes involving its resi-
dents, the fact that plaintiff chose to seek relief in 
Pennsylvania, and the lack of evidence that litigating 
in Pennsylvania would impose a significant burden on 
defendant. Accordingly, the  Zippo court denied the 
motion to dismiss and allowed the case to proceed in 
Pennsylvania. 
 POST- ZIPPO PATENT CASES 
 Many courts have adopted some permutation 
of the  Zippo test since it was announced more than 
a decade ago. At least in theory, the use of such 
a well-defined test should provide some benefits; 
namely, it should increase predictability for litigants 
and ease the burden on the courts in deciding these 
difficult jurisdictional questions. But this one-size-
fits-all approach contradicts the Supreme Court’s 
mandate that personal jurisdiction be decided on 
a case-by-case basis. 23 Moreover, many courts have 
reflexively followed the  Zippo test without regard to 
either the basic tenets of the personal jurisdiction 
doctrine or the particular factual circumstances of 
the case. Thus, in reality, the  Zippo test has con-
tributed to the creation of a body of case law on 
Internet-related personal jurisdiction that is confus-
ing, inconsistent, and sometimes even inaccurate. 
This is particularly problematic in patent cases 
where district courts are supposed to follow Federal 
Circuit law on personal jurisdiction, but have 
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resorted to relying on the regional circuit courts for 
guidance given the Federal Circuit’s silence on the 
issue. 
 General Jurisdiction vs. Specific Jurisdiction 
 In  Zippo , the court made clear that it was con-
sidering only whether defendant was subject to 
specific, rather than general, jurisdiction and that 
the sliding scale test was applicable to the purpose-
ful availment prong of the specific jurisdiction test. 
Nonetheless, a common mistake that district courts 
have made is that they have misapplied the  Zippo 
sliding-scale test to assertions of general jurisdic-
tion. As noted earlier, a court may exercise gen-
eral jurisdiction when a defendant has continuous 
and systematic contacts with the forum state. In 
assessing general jurisdiction, courts must consider 
all of the defendant’s activities within the forum 
state and then determine whether those contacts, 
in their totality, essentially equate to “presence” 
in the state. 24 Thus, the fact that the defendant 
maintains a Web site—whether active, passive, or 
interactive in nature—should be factored into the 
general jurisdiction calculation, but it rarely should 
be determinative. 
More troubling is the inconsis-
tency among lower courts deciding 
patent cases as to the character-
ization of a Web site as active, 
interactive, or passive.
 Yet courts often overlook the fact that  Zippo 
was a specific jurisdiction case and rely on the 
sliding-scale test to decide whether a defendant 
charged with patent infringement should be subject 
to general jurisdiction in the forum state. In  Enlink 
Geoenergy Services, Inc. v. Jackson & Sons Drilling & 
Pump, Inc. , 25 for example, the plaintiff patent holder 
argued that the alleged infringer was subject to gen-
eral jurisdiction in California because it maintained 
a Web site accessible to California residents that 
advertised and displayed the allegedly infringing 
products. The court disagreed with plaintiff, holding 
that the Web site was merely passive in nature and, 
therefore, insufficient to establish general jurisdic-
tion. 26 The opinion suggests, however, that the court 
might have reached a different result had the Web 
site been more interactive. 
 Active, Interactive, or Passive Web Site 
 Even more troubling is the inconsistency among 
lower courts deciding patent cases as to the character-
ization of a Web site as active, interactive, or passive. 
In these cases, the courts are properly considering 
the  Zippo sliding-scale test to evaluate whether the 
 defendant has satisfied the purposeful availment 
prong of the specific jurisdiction test; yet their con-
clusions vary dramatically. 
 In the first line of cases, courts have interpreted 
the purposeful availment requirement rather liber-
ally and have subjected defendants to jurisdiction 
even where no Internet sales of the allegedly infring-
ing products have occurred. In  O’Donnell v. Animal 
Matters, Inc., 27  the patent holder sued for patent 
infringement in North Carolina asserting that defen-
dant was subject to jurisdiction as a result of its Web 
site. Although defendant did not sell the accused 
products over the Internet, its site listed retailers that 
sold the products, including two in North Carolina, 
along with name and contact information for those 
retailers. The court held that this activity amounted 
to “purposeful direction” and that exercising jurisdic-
tion based on such virtual contacts would comport 
with due process. 28 
 Similarly, in  Litmer v. PDQUSA.com , 29 the 
court held that defendant’s Web site was suffi-
ciently “interactive” to satisfy the purposeful prong 
of the specific jurisdiction test. In that case, the 
defendant offered the allegedly infringing product 
for sale over its Web site, which was accessible in 
every state, including Indiana where the patent 
holder ultimately sued. Unlike most commercial 
Web sites, however, sales could not be completed 
over the Web site. Instead, the purchaser would 
provide certain information over the Internet, such 
as name, address, and number of products that it 
wished to order, and then the seller would follow 
up with a telephone call to collect payment. The 
court nevertheless concluded that, under the  Zippo 
test, the Web site was highly interactive and that 
defendant’s activities “were purposefully directed at 
other forums, including Indiana.” 30 
 At the opposite end of the spectrum are the 
courts in the second line of cases. These courts have 
held that selling goods over the Internet does not nec-
essarily subject a defendant to the jurisdiction of the 
purchaser, even when that sale gave rise to the cause 
of action. In  Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research Products , 31 
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for example, plaintiff brought a patent infringe-
ment action in Maryland against Vitamin Research 
Products (VPR), a Nevada corporation that was sell-
ing a dietary supplement over the Internet that alleg-
edly infringed plaintiff ’s patent. It was  undisputed 
that VPR operated a commercial Web site and that 
at least two Maryland residents had purchased the 
accused products through that site. But the court 
held that such contacts did not amount to purposeful 
availment because “[n]othing on VPR’s website sug-
gests that VPR intended to target Maryland residents 
any more than it intended to target residents of other 
states.” 32 
The time has come for the Federal 
Circuit to take a position and 
explain to lower courts how 
Internet-related activity should 
affect the personal jurisdiction 
analysis in patent cases.
 The  Shamsuddin court seemed to require “some-
thing more” for jurisdiction just like Justice O’Connor 
did in  Asahi with respect to the more traditional 
stream of commerce. And in recent years, several 
other district courts presiding over patent cases have 
imposed this “something more” or “targeting” require-
ment in order for a Web site to subject a defendant 
to personal jurisdiction. 33 These courts posit, in 
other words, that “[c]reating a site, like placing a 
product into the stream-of-commerce, may be felt 
 nationwide—or even worldwide—but, without more, 
it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum 
state.” 34 
 Finally, in the third line of cases, which can be 
seen as a sort of middle ground, courts have held that 
a defendant purposefully avails itself by maintaining 
a Web site through which it has sold the allegedly 
infringing products to residents of the forum state. 
In  3M Company v. Mohan , 35 for example, defendant 
Pradeep Mohan, a California resident, was selling 
his line of stethoscopes on various Internet sites. 
Plaintiff 3M Company believed that the stethoscopes 
infringed its patents and sued Mohan in district 
court in Minnesota, contending that he was subject 
to specific jurisdiction there. The court found that 
Mohan had sold the allegedly infringing products to 
Minnesota residents over the Internet and that those 
sales totaled approximately $400 or 2 percent of his 
Web sales. 36 The court then determined that these 
sales, albeit minimal, were sufficient for purposeful 
availment under  Zippo . 
 Several other district courts have followed the 
 Mohan line of reasoning in patent cases. 37 For example, 
in  Tristrata Technology, Inc. v. Emulgen Laboratories, 
Inc. , 38 the defendant conducted a nationwide email 
campaign to advertise the allegedly infringing prod-
ucts. As a result of this campaign, defendant received 
orders from and shipped the accused products to 
four Delaware residents. After being sued for patent 
infringement in Delaware, defendant moved to dis-
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the ground 
that it should not be subject to specific jurisdiction 
in Delaware because its sales there were  de mini-
mis . The court rejected this argument, explaining 
that, “[b]ecause [defendant’s] forum-related conduct 
forms the basis of the injuries alleged by [plaintiff], 
[defendant’s] contacts do not need to be continuous 
and substantial.” 39 In sum, courts in this third line of 
cases have held that, “where a defendant infringer is 
shown to have sold the allegedly infringing product 
in the forum state, the forum may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over defendant.” 40 
 THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
AND INTERNET-RELATED 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
 The previous discussion demonstrates some of 
the inconsistencies that have arisen in patent cases 
with respect to Internet-related personal jurisdiction. 
The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 in order to 
avoid such problems; it was to bring uniformity and 
consistency to our patent system. Yet, despite the 
frequency with which personal jurisdiction is chal-
lenged in patent cases and despite that district courts 
have been grappling with this question for many years 
now, the Federal Circuit has failed to provide clear 
guidance on this issue. As discussed in this section, 
the time has come for the Federal Circuit to take a 
position and explain to lower courts how Internet-
related activity should affect the personal jurisdiction 
analysis in patent cases. 
 TRINITEC 
 In a recent decision,  Trinitec Industries, Inc. v. 
Pedre Promotion Products, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
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considered whether a defendant should be subject to 
personal jurisdiction based on virtual contacts. In that 
case, though, the analysis focused on the long-arm 
statute, not on the question whether the exercise of 
jurisdiction would comport with federal due process. 
Nevertheless, the  Trinitec opinion is relevant because 
it provides some insight as to how the Federal Circuit 
might rule when confronted with this issue head on. 
 In  Trinitec , the plaintiffs sued a New York cor-
poration for patent infringement in the District of 
Columbia. Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction on the ground that the exer-
cise of jurisdiction would violate both the District 
of Columbia long-arm statute and due process. 
With respect to the long-arm statute, plaintiffs had 
to  demonstrate either that the claims arose from 
 defendant’s transacting business in the District of 
Columbia or that the defendant had caused tortious 
injury in the District. 
 To demonstrate that defendant was transact-
ing business in the District, plaintiff pointed to 
defendant’s Web site on which it was advertising and 
selling the allegedly infringing products. The Federal 
Circuit acknowledged that, some cases, including 
 Zippo , “have suggested that the availability and use of 
a highly interactive, transaction-oriented website . . . 
by itself may support long-arm jurisdiction wherever 
the site is available to potential customers for the 
purpose of doing business.” 41 In this case, however, 
the court concluded that the existence of a Web 
site alone, even a commercial one, is insufficient 
to prove that defendant was transacting business in 
the District of Columbia because “the website is not 
directed at customers in the District of Columbia, but 
instead is available to all customers throughout the 
country who have access to the Internet.” 42 
 Nor was the  Trinitec court able to determine 
whether defendant had caused tortious injury in the 
District via its Internet activity. It is well established 
that the sale of an infringing product within a forum 
causes tortious injury there since patent infringement 
is a tort. But in this case, plaintiff merely established 
that defendant maintained a Web site  capable of sell-
ing infringing products to residents of the District , not that 
any District residents had ever actually purchased 
the accused products over the Web site. This was not 
enough, in the court’s opinion, to satisfy the tortious 
injury provision of the long-arm statute that required 
actual sales to District residents. 
 Under these circumstances, the  Trinitec court held 
that the record was not sufficient to decide whether 
the District of Columbia long-arm statute was satis-
fied, so it remanded the case for further proceedings. 
The court never discussed the due process portion of 
the personal jurisdiction analysis. Indeed, the court 
explicitly stated that it was expressing no opinion as 
to whether the exercise of jurisdiction in this case 
would be constitutional. As discussed later, however, 
 Trinitec may very well foreshadow the approach the 
Federal Circuit is likely to take with respect to the 
due process inquiry of the personal jurisdiction test. 
 THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S APPROACH 
 The Federal Circuit has so far refused to take a 
position with respect to two very important issues 
related to personal jurisdiction that arise in patent 
cases: (1) whether a defendant is subject to personal 
jurisdiction because the accused products reached the 
forum state through the stream-of-commerce, and 
(2) whether a defendant subjects itself to jurisdiction 
by maintaining an interactive Web site accessible 
in the forum state. These issues are closely related, 
and patent litigants and lower courts certainly need 
guidance on both. This article, however, focuses on 
the latter and explores the Federal Circuit’s likely 
approach to questions of Internet-related personal 
jurisdiction. 
 Trinitec may very well foreshadow 
the approach the Federal Circuit is 
likely to take with respect to the 
due process inquiry of the person-
al jurisdiction test.
 Although the Federal Circuit’s delay in address-
ing this jurisdictional question has caused frustration 
and confusion, the flip side is that the Federal Circuit 
will have the benefit of substantial case law and com-
mentary when it ultimately resolves the split among 
the lower courts. Thus, the Federal Circuit should be 
able to avoid some of the mistakes that other courts 
have made in this context, such as misapplying  Zippo 
to general jurisdiction and treating the  Zippo test as 
a categorical rule. Rather, the Federal Circuit likely 
understands by now that the  Zippo sliding-scale 
analysis should be used only in the specific jurisdic-
tion context “as a tool to determine the purposeful 
31
J u n e  2 0 1 0  J O U R N A L  O F  I N T E R N E T  L A W
availment of a defendant to a forum.” 43 So the Federal 
Circuit’s first priority should be to make this clear for 
lower courts and litigants. 
 But even assuming that courts understand that 
 Zippo applies only in the specific jurisdiction context, 
other questions about Internet-related jurisdiction 
need to be resolved. In a typical patent infringement 
case where jurisdiction is based on Internet activity, 
the patent owner contends that the defendant is 
subject to jurisdiction because it was offering to sell 
the allegedly infringing products over the Internet, 
including to residents of the forum state. Thus, the 
question for the Federal Circuit will be whether 
those types of virtual contacts—namely, offering to 
sell the infringing products on a Web site accessible 
 nationwide—amount to purposeful availment. 
 Trinitec suggests that the court 
would be loathe to find that  merely 
maintaining a Web site advertising 
the accused product amounts to 
purposeful availment.
 Like the lower courts, the Federal Circuit will 
have three options for tackling this problem. First, it 
could interpret the purposeful availment requirement 
liberally, so that maintaining a Web site that offers to 
sell the accused products by itself would support juris-
diction. This is similar to Justice Brennan’s approach 
in the traditional stream-of-commerce context where 
placing a product in the stream of commerce with 
an awareness that the final product could be sold in 
the forum state is all that is necessary to subject the 
defendant to jurisdiction. 
 Second, the Federal Circuit could decide that 
a Web site offering to sell the allegedly infringing 
 products is not enough for jurisdiction. Instead, the 
plaintiff would have to show that the defendant 
actually sold those products over the Internet to 
residents of the forum state. Of course, it is impor-
tant to note in this regard that jurisdiction cannot be 
manufactured. For example, a plaintiff who resides 
in California and wants to sue in New York cannot 
arrange for his New York-based attorney to purchase 
the allegedly infringing product and then claim that 
jurisdiction should be based on that single sale to a 
New York resident. 44 
 Third, the Federal Circuit could follow a 
more restrictive approach to jurisdiction requiring 
 “something more” than Internet sales of the accused 
products to residents of the forum state. The court 
might, for instance, require the defendant to “target” 
forum residents in some way, such as by advertising in 
the state or designing its products specifically for that 
state’s residents. 45 This approach resembles Justice 
O’Connor’s in  Asahi where she held that placing a 
product in the stream of commerce, without more, is 
insufficient for purposeful availment. 
 So, which of these approaches is the Federal 
Circuit likely to take? And perhaps more importantly, 
is that the approach that the Federal Circuit  should 
take? Because of  Trinitec we know something about 
the way that the Federal Circuit (or, more accurately, 
one panel of the court) is thinking about some of 
these issues.  Trinitec suggests that the court would be 
loathe to find that merely maintaining a Web site 
advertising the accused product amounts to purpose-
ful availment since it concluded that such a Web site 
was insufficient to satisfy the “transacting business” 
prong of the D.C. long-arm statute. Instead, when 
a defendant’s Web site is its only contact with the 
forum state and there’s no evidence that any actual 
sales of the accused products have been made, the 
Federal Circuit will probably require some additional 
proof that defendant directed its site at residents of 
the forum in question. 
 It is a bit more difficult to predict how the 
Federal Circuit might rule when the defendant’s Web 
site does not target the forum, but actual sales of the 
allegedly infringing product have been made to only 
a few forum residents. On the one hand, the Supreme 
Court has made clear that the exercise of specific 
jurisdiction may be supported by a single contact 
as long as it was related or gave rise to plaintiff ’s 
cause of action. 46 This prerequisite would appear to 
be satisfied in patent infringement cases since the 
single contact—the sale of an allegedly infringing 
product—would be directly and substantially related 
to plaintiff ’s claim for patent infringement. 
 In  Trinitec , however, the court implied that a 
single sale may not be enough to show that defen-
dant was “transacting business” in the District of 
Columbia. 47 Specifically, the court said: “Although 
Trinitec has shown that Pedre’s websites contain some 
interactive features aimed at transacting business, it is 
unclear how frequently those features are utilized or, 
indeed, whether any District residents have ever actu-
ally used Pedre’s website to transact business.” 48 Thus, 
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if the court believes that sales to only a few forum 
residents would be insufficient to satisfy the long-arm 
statute, then it may similarly conclude that such lim-
ited sales do not amount to purposeful  availment for 
due process purposes. 
 For courts that have adopted either Justice 
Brennan’s or Justice O’Connor’s approach to  stream-
of-commerce jurisdiction, the decision as to Internet 
jurisdiction may appear to be a simple one. If “some-
thing more” is required under the stream-of-commerce 
theory, then there also must be “something more” for 
a Web site to subject a defendant to personal jurisdic-
tion. Conversely, in a jurisdiction following Justice 
Brennan as to the stream-of-commerce theory, the 
courts may very well adopt a more liberal approach 
with respect to the Internet as well. 
 Unlike most of the regional circuit courts, how-
ever, the Federal Circuit has not yet taken a position 
on the stream-of-commerce theory of personal jurisdic-
tion; thus, it cannot simply transpose that rule to the 
Internet context. Interestingly, this places the Federal 
Circuit in an advantageous position because the court 
will write on a clean slate. So, in deciding which 
approach to follow, the Federal Circuit should consider 
that, although similarities between the traditional 
stream-of-commerce and Internet-based jurisdiction 
certainly exist, there are important distinctions too. 
 With respect to the traditional theory, the defen-
dant places its products into the stream of commerce, 
those products make their way to the forum state, 
and then eventually are sold in the forum state by a 
third party. In the Internet context, by contrast, the 
defendant itself creates a Web site and the defendant 
itself sells those products over the Internet to resi-
dents of the forum state. Since the purposeful avail-
ment requirement is satisfied when the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state “proximately result 
from actions by the defendant himself that create a 
substantial connection with the forum State,” 49 there 
is a much stronger basis for exercising jurisdiction 
over defendants who sell their products directly over 
the Internet than those who place products into the 
stream of commerce that eventually are sold in the 
forum state by a third party. 
 Finally, in choosing an approach, the Federal 
Circuit should be mindful of the particular nature 
of specific jurisdiction. In the general jurisdiction 
context, it is the quantity of defendant’s contacts that 
matters, that is, are the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum state continuous and systematic? With respect 
to specific jurisdiction, though, the focus is on the 
quality of the contacts, namely, did the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state give rise to the cause 
of action? As the Federal Circuit itself has acknowl-
edged, “even a single contact with a forum state may 
suffice for personal jurisdiction if it is directly and 
substantially related to the plaintiff’s claim.” 50 Thus, 
the fact that an alleged patent infringer sold only a 
few of the accused items in the forum state should not 
be relevant to specific jurisdiction. The question the 
Federal Circuit should be asking is whether those con-
tacts gave rise to the plaintiff’s claim. In patent cases, 
where the contact is the sale of allegedly infringing 
products and the cause of action is patent infringe-
ment, the court likely will be able to answer that ques-
tion in the affirmative, which means the defendant 
usually will be subject to specific  jurisdiction. 
 CONCLUSION 
 Personal jurisdiction questions, particularly those 
concerning Internet-related contacts, arise frequently 
in patent infringement actions. Federal Circuit law 
is supposed to govern personal jurisdiction in patent 
cases, but so far the Federal Circuit has said very little 
about Internet-related jurisdiction. As a result, lower 
courts are sharply divided as to the relevance of  Zippo 
in patent cases, and potential defendants are left 
guessing whether their conduct might subject them 
to jurisdiction in a particular forum. 
 This is not to suggest that the Federal Circuit 
should adopt a bright-line rule regarding Internet-
related jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has eschewed 
such definitive rules and has mandated that personal 
jurisdiction be decided on a case-by-case basis. 51 Yet, 
given the current inconsistent and confusing state of 
the law in patent cases, the Federal Circuit needs to 
provide lower courts and litigants some guidance as 
to the impact of virtual contacts on personal juris-
diction generally and the  Zippo sliding-scale test in 
particular. 
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